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Abstract
In recent years, donor countries have increasingly used different aid allocation channels to boost aid effectiveness. One
delivery channel that has grown tremendously is ‘multi-bi aid’—contributions to multilateral organizations earmarked
for specific development purposes. This article examines whether donors use multi-bi aid to further their selfish goals—
specifically, to garner political support for their ambition to become a temporary member of the UN Security Council. In
this context, multi-bi aid is particularly beneficial to countries with limited experience as foreign aid donors; whose gover-
nance quality is weak; and which are more internationalized. Using a sample of OECD/DAC donor countries in 1995–2016,
time-series cross-section analysis corroborates these arguments. The analysis draws on a new dataset of media reports
proxying for donor interest in winning a temporary seat in the UN Security Council and extended data onmulti-bi aid flows.
The findings demonstrate that multi-bi aid may be a tool for geopolitical influence, with yet unexplored consequences for
aid effectiveness.
Keywords
donor interest; earmarked funding; foreign aid; multi-bi aid; UN Security Council
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Aid Impact and Effectiveness”, edited by Rachel M. Gisselquist and Finn Tarp (UNU-WIDER,
Finland).
© 2019 by UNU-WIDER; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
A growing body of work demonstrates that donor mo-
tivations matter for aid effectiveness (Dreher & Kilby,
2010; Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, &Werker, 2013; Headey,
2008). Many observers infer donor motivations from dif-
ferent aid channels, arguing that bilateral aid advances
selfish goals, while multilateral aid promotes collective
goals by helping donors coordinate aid efforts, enhanc-
ing the credibility of aid commitments, and exploiting the
expertise of multilateral bureaucracies (Hawkins, Lake,
Nielson, & Tierney, 2006).
The traditional distinction between bilateral aid and
multilateral aid, however, is no longer tenable. Multi-
bi aid—donor contributions to multilateral organizations
earmarked for specific purposes—has emerged as a
‘third way’ of allocating foreign aid beside traditional
channels (Reinsberg, 2017; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, &
Eichenauer, 2015; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, & Knack,
2017). Inferring donor motivations is difficult for multi-
bi aid because it combines motivational elements of
both traditional modalities—the quest for control and
the preference for cooperation.
Therefore, the motivations underlying multi-bi aid
likely depend on additional circumstances. In some cases,
multi-bi aid is purely developmental as donors use it to
push multilaterals toward interventions yielding tangi-
ble results and efficiency-enhancing reforms (Reinsberg,
2017; Reinsberg et al., 2015; Sridhar & Woods, 2013).
In other cases—which are relatively underappreciated in
the current literature—multi-bi aid may further the for-
eign policy goals of the donors.
As a test case for foreign-policy uses of multi-bi aid,
I examine aid growth in the context of donor campaigns
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for a temporary seat in the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC)—the only global institution to authorize the
use of force and as such an important venue for wielding
policy influence. Donor countries may therefore use for-
eign aid to win support for their UNSC campaign among
UNmember states. However, not all aid types are equally
beneficial and uniformly available to all donors. In par-
ticular, donor countries with less experienced aid agen-
cies are unable to muster capacities for short-term aid
increases and should therefore be particularly likely to
increase multi-bi funding, as a sufficiently targeted and
quickly disbursable aid channel. Furthermore, donors
with weak governance should use multi-bi aid to ad-
vance their UNSC campaign, as bilateral assistancewould
raise public concerns about non-development uses of
aid. Finally, multi-bi aid provides internationally-oriented
donors with an instrument to undergird their preference
for international cooperation while creating the regional
co-benefits that multilateral aid is unlikely to provide.
I test my theoretical arguments using data for up
to 35 Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD)/Donor Assistance Committee (DAC)
donor countries over 1995–2016. I analyze whether the
campaign activity of a donor for a temporary UNSC seat
predicts contemporaneous aid increases. I proceed with
fixed-effect linear panel regressions. In further analysis,
I also take potential endogeneity of campaigning with re-
spect to aid growth into account. In both cases, I find
that donors support UNSC campaigns with multi-bi aid
specifically when their own aid agencies are less expe-
rienced, when their governance frameworks are weak,
and when they are more internationalized. To demon-
strate the plausibility of these findings, I provide quotes
from interviews with government officials.
My study contributes to the literature on the polit-
ical economy of international organizations and aid al-
location. Within the broad literature on the UNSC (e.g.,
Malone, 2000; Mikulaschek, 2018; Prantl, 2005; Voeten,
2001; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014a), some research focuses
on who gets elected to the institution (Dreher, Gould,
Rablen, & Vreeland, 2014; Schmitz & Schwarze, 2012;
Vreeland & Dreher, 2014b), whereas other research ex-
plicitly links aid allocation and multilateral lending de-
cisions to temporary UNSC membership of recipient
countries (Dreher, Lang, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2018;
Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009; Kuziemko & Werker,
2006; Lim & Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014a).
In contrast to these studies, I focus on the strategies that
donors use to enhance their chances of getting them-
selves elected to the institution.
In addition, I complement existing research on the
determinants of multi-bi aid (Eichenauer & Reinsberg,
2017). My analysis establishes conditions under which
multi-bi aid is attractive for geopolitical purposes, as the
posited effect is only present for small donors without
entrenched aid bureaucracies. By focusing on one spe-
cific aspect of geostrategic use of aid, I extend previous
aid allocation research, which often uses broad proxies
for donor interest (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy,
2006; Hoeffler&Outram, 2011). Indeed, the rise ofmulti-
bi aid has created new avenues for donor influence—
with yet unknown consequences for aid effectiveness.
Previous research suggests that geopolitically motivated
aid is less effective, for instance due to sloppier project
preparation under time pressure, the approval of lower-
quality projects, and lower compliance with condition-
ality (Dreher et al., 2013; Kilby, 2013; Stone, 2009).
Whether this holds also for multi-bi aid is an open ques-
tion though, given that donor motivations cannot easily
be inferred for this type of aid.
2. Argument
Countries vie for UNSC membership for three main
reasons: gaining international prestige and reputation
for being a responsible nation in the pursuit of global
peace; advancing the national position on an upcoming
issue; and promoting broader objectives and collective
norms (Malone, 2000, pp. 6–7). Official statements re-
flect that developed countries consider UNSC member-
ship to be valuable to them. For instance, a Canadian rep-
resentative, leading his country toward a bid for a non-
permanent seat in 2011–12, argued, “[g]enerally speak-
ing, you can see that the big issues do get discussed at
the UN Security Council…[w]hen you take yourself out
of that game, you lose one of the vehicles you have for
having some influence” (The Canadian Press, 2014). In
an earlier bid, Canada had announced to use the influ-
ence afforded by a UNSC seat to promote “human se-
curity,” following up on its earlier success in pushing for
an anti-personnel landmine convention and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Malone, 2000, p. 7).
The UNSC consists of the five permanent members
(P5)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States—and ten non-permanent members
which are elected in periodic ballots at the UN Gen-
eral Assembly (UNGA) to serve two-year tenures. Be-
sides “contributions to the maintenance of international
peace” (United Nations, 1945, art. 23), the UN Charter
requires equitable geographical representation of non-
permanent members, which is ensured by allotting the
temporary seats to five regional groups in the follow-
ing manner: three seats for the African group, two seats
for the Asia-Pacific group (APG), two seats for the Latin
American and Caribbean states group (GRULAC), one
seat for the Eastern European group (EEG), and two seats
for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).1
Half of the temporary seats are up for grabs each year,
which implies different schedules of UNGA elections
across caucus groups. Every even year, two seats for
WEOG, one for the APG, one for GRULAC, and one for
the African Group come up for election, whereas every
odd year, states vie for two seats for the African Group,
one for the APG, one for the EEG, and one for GRULAC.
1 According to a gentlemen agreement, Africa and Asia make available one seat for an Arab country in alternating order.
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The selection of the non-permanent UNSC mem-
bers follows a two-stage process. First, countries self-
nominate for candidacy in their respective regional
group. They simply declare their candidacy to their re-
gional chair in New York, which then adds the coun-
try to the list of candidates (Security Council Report,
2009, p. 9).Most candidates informUNmembers of their
candidacy afterwards. While some regional groups have
established informal practice of rotation-based nomi-
nations, other groups have no established procedures
to coordinate the nomination process. In the former
groups, the sole candidate for an open seat typically
has regional endorsement. In the latter groups, how-
ever, competition for seats is intense, as the number
of candidates exceeds the number of available seats.
For example, WEOG follows an “open-market practice”
(Malone, 2000, p. 5) in which members compete over
seats freely. For example, the current WEOG seats are
split among three countries—Sweden for a full tenure
and Italy and the Netherlands serving subsequent one-
year terms (United Nations, 2016). As a result, countries
aspiring for UNSC membership have come to announce
their candidature far in advance, in the hope to remain
uncontested. For example, Switzerland has announced
its candidature for 2023–24 in 2011 (Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Competition for the Eastern
European seat is similarly high. Contested ballots are
not uncommon: 9 out of the 12 elections in 1990–2015
were initially contested. For example, four countries—
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Hungary, and Slovenia—declared
interest to represent the region in 2012–13, but given
regional pressures to avoid contested elections, several
countries dropped their aspirations later in the process.
Following the nomination phase, the UN member
states vote for candidates in the UNGA. The election is a
secret ballot and a candidate requires two-third majority
approval of all countries participating in the ballot in or-
der to be elected as temporary UNSC member. If no can-
didate obtains the required majority, run-off votes con-
tinue until one of the candidates is elected. UNGA elec-
tions typically take place in the last quarter of a year, with
new tenures beginning in the first month of the subse-
quent year. After a country has served its two-year term
in the UNSC, it cannot immediately re-apply for candida-
ture for two years (United Nations, 1945, art. 23).
To further their chances of election for a temporary
UNSC seat, states recur to several tools of foreign pol-
icy. Based on an inductive analysis of media reports of
UNSC candidates, I have identified at least four such
tools. First, states can win over other UN members by
rhetorically supporting policy positions that are impor-
tant to them. For example, the Czech Republic, vying
for the 2008–09 Eastern European seat, also claimed
by Croatia, attempted to win the votes of Morocco by
shunning the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed (CTK
Daily News, 2006). Second, states can mutually support
candidatures for lucrative posts in international bodies.
Support for a UNSC bid may be reciprocated by later
support for candidature in another international orga-
nization. Australia provides an example, which secured
support for its 2013–14 bid from Rwanda in exchange
for supporting Rwanda in its membership application to
the Commonwealth (BBCMonitoring Africa, 2009). Third,
states can curry favor by promising an expansion of bi-
lateral trade and foreign direct investment. For instance,
Japan committed to have its businesses invest USD 5.7
billion in infrastructure projects in Bangladesh,whilewin-
ning support for its bid for a temporary seat on the UNSC
(Reuters, 2014).
Fourth, states can use foreign aid to persuade other
countries to vote for them in a UNGA ballot. Although
aid-giving—in contrast to the previous tools—is limited
to less developed countries, it is relatively more com-
mon. Descriptive analysis ofmedia reports on UNSC cam-
paigns over the past 20 years—available from Factiva—
yields 15 news reports that explicitly mention pledges of
aid in the context of UNSC candidatures—either gener-
ally to specific causes, or (more commonly) to specific
countries. Ten pledges were from WEOG states, 4 from
Asian-Pacific states, and one from the EEG. Obviously,
this ismerely a lower bound of the true extent of the phe-
nomenon, given that some aid may be given privately in
an expectation for votes in return. In contrast, the data
entail only 12 new reports in which deeper economic co-
operation was offered (explicitly)—six by WEOG donors,
three by the APG, one from EEG, and two from GRULAC.
2.1. Can Aid Buy Support for UNSC Candidatures?
Donors can further their chances of winning a temporary
seat by increasing foreign aid, especially to poorer coun-
tries, which depend on foreign aid for economic devel-
opment and which may be willing to support a donor
vying for a seat in return for aid—an important exam-
ple of an “aid-for-policy deal” (Bueno de Mesquita &
Smith, 2009).2 Some donors are open about how aid sup-
ports their foreign policy goals, especially in contested
races. For example, the foreign affairs minister of a small
donor said:
The main thing is: Do we get a return on that invest-
ment? Given what we spend on the Commonwealth,
and campaigning for a seat on the Security Council,
this is just one more opportunity to engage with lead-
ers of other countries and convince them to support
New Zealand.
The country paid almost USD 1 million to the Common-
wealth secretariat in 2011–12 and provided technical as-
sistance over USD 4 million to Commonwealth countries,
while seeking support for its bid for temporary UNSC
membership (Dominion Post, 2003).
Whereas more aid can increase the chances of win-
ning, less aid can decrease them—an unpleasant lesson
2 These deals occur because developing countries are assumed to care more about material benefits than (most) policy issues given their low income.
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learnt by Australia, Iceland, Spain, and Sweden. For in-
stance, when Iceland was hit by the Global Financial
Crisis in 2008, its chances for the 2009–10 spot for which
it had vied were hurt according to Western diplomats
(CNN, 2008). Concerns were also growing in Spain that
the stagnating aid budget—a result of the Global Finan-
cial Crisis—would adversely affect the chances of win-
ning a UNSC seat in 2015–16. In Sweden, where pres-
sures on aid budgets mounted due to refugee costs, simi-
lar concerns were raised (Jacobsen, 2015). The above dis-
cussion implies the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Donors will increase foreign aid to ad-
vance their campaigns for a temporary UNSC seat.
2.2. Choice of Aid Channels
Donors face a decision of which aid channel to use for
advancing their UNSC campaign. The decision to alter
the distribution of aid across delivery channels may be
particularly important if the donor is unable to increase
total aid. First, a donor can use bilateral aid, which is
typically given to a recipient government. It is attractive
to both sides as it furthers the foreign policy goal of
the donor while being valuable to the recipient govern-
ment, especially if provided as general budget support.
In contrast, multilateral aid involves the pooling of re-
sources among several donors and delegation to a mul-
tilateral aid agency that uses the funds at its own dis-
cretion. By diluting the influence of any individual donor
and due to its long commitment cycles, multilateral aid
is unlikely to be used for buying support for UNSC can-
didatures. Finally, multi-bi aid—donor contributions to
multilateral organizations earmarked for specific devel-
opment purposes—affords donors a third channel of aid
delivery. It is a flexible mechanism whereby donors can
support specific regions, countries, themes, or sectors
through special funds, whose aid allocation decisions are
not generally overseen by the formal governing bodies of
the host multilaterals. For instance, Australia took advan-
tage of this flexibility and providedmulti-bi aid through a
UN organization to garner support for its UNSC campaign
in Ethiopia (Australian Associated Press, 2008).
Not all aid channels are equally attractive to all
donors and under all circumstances given that donors
vie for a temporary UNSC seat. Focusing on multi-bi aid,
I derive three hypotheses on when this channel is par-
ticularly attractive. First and foremost, I expect donors
with limited experience and thus capacity to stem short-
term aid increases to be particularly likely to increase
multi-bi aid to support their UNSC campaign. To these
donors, multi-bi aid is the only way to direct funding that
is sufficiently targeted and quickly disbursable. Alterna-
tive channels are not appropriate: While multilateral aid
cannot be targeted, bilateral aid is not a feasible option
due to capacity limitations that these donors face. An ob-
servable implication is that experienced donors aremore
likely to use bilateral aid in support of a UNSC campaign.
Hypothesis 2: As donor experience increases, a donor
will increase bilateral aid but decrease multi-bi aid in
the context of a UNSC campaign.
Second, donors with relatively higher levels of domes-
tic corruption are more likely to use multi-bi aid. A size-
able literature argues that donor characteristics not only
matter for aid effectiveness (Bourguignon & Sundberg,
2007; Dreher & Kilby, 2010; Wright &Winters, 2010) but
also affect aid channel choices (Dietrich, 2013; Dietrich
& Wright, 2015; Reinsberg et al., 2017). Public opin-
ion can constrain donor choices in that a more skepti-
cal public forces donor governments to re-route larger
shares of their aid budget through multilateral organiza-
tions which publics generally trust more to act as pro-
development actors (Milner, 2006). Similarly, publics are
easily alienated by aid fraud—whether in recipient coun-
tries (Bauhr, Charron, & Nasiritousi, 2013) or in their
own government,which implies that donor governments
with weak governance may need to channel aid mul-
tilaterally to reassure domestic audiences of aid being
well spent. An observable implication is that donors with
“good governance” are more likely to use bilateral aid to
support their campaigns.
Hypothesis 3: As governance quality increases, a
donor will increase bilateral aid but decrease multi-bi
aid in the context of a UNSC campaign.
Third, donor preferences for international cooperation
matter. Some donors traditionally use aid more to ad-
vance narrow foreign policy goals (Bueno de Mesquita
& Smith, 2009), while others conceive aid as a vehicle
to build partnerships and to demonstrate international
solidarity (Lumsdaine, 1993). Sweden is an example of a
country that embraces the latter view. Having faced sky-
rocketing domestic expenses due to the refugee crisis,
the Swedish government needed to consider significant
cuts to the aid budget in recent years. The Swedish for-
eign ministry wrote that in such an event Sweden would
damage its reputation and that it “would also have to
give up its candidacy for a seat in the United Nations
Security Council, as [its] high development aid contribu-
tion is seen as its most important trump card” (Jacobsen,
2015). Hence, specifically donors with an ideological
commitment to aid will use multi-bi aid if prompted by
the opportunity to win a UNSC seat to increase over-
all aid. An observable implication is that less outward-
oriented donors should prefer bilateral aid to advance
their campaigns.
Hypothesis 4: As a donor becomesmore international-
ized, it will increasemulti-bi aid but decrease bilateral
aid in the context of a UNSC campaign.
In the empirical analysis, I also consider heterogeneous
effects with respect to constituency. As sufficient time-
series information on aid flows is available only for states
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that report to the OECD, specifically its DAC, I consider
three constituencies—WEOG, EEG, and APG.
3. Data and Methods
I construct a panel dataset of initially 40 donors over
the 1995–2016 period in the Northern hemisphere—23
WEOG donors, 12 EEG donors, and the two APG donors,
Japan and Korea. Due to missing data, the panel is un-
balanced. For three permanent UNSC members (France,
United Kingdom, and the United States), the posited
mechanism does not apply and I thus exclude these
donors from the sample. The results are unchanged
when including them nonetheless, as shown in a robust-
ness test.3 I chose the sample period to allow for suffi-
cient time after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
in viewof concerns over data quality as somedonors only
then joined the OECD/DAC and began reporting their
aid flows.
3.1. Dependent Variables
I disaggregate total aid into its three main channels—
bilateral aid, multilateral aid, and multi-bi aid. I rely
primarily on OECD/DAC data for that purpose (OECD,
2018). For multi-bi aid, OECD/DAC data only cover the
2006–16 period; to extend the time series to prior sam-
ple years, I rely on the multi-bi aid data (Eichenauer &
Reinsberg, 2017). The multi-bi aid data are available for
23 OECD/DAC donors and are based on the Creditor Re-
porting System, which ensures that both data sources
are consistent.4 For each aid flow, I apply a logarithmic
transformation to mitigate outliers.5 Using aid changes
(rather than levels) helps de-trending the time series.
This is also suggested by diagnostic tests.6 Furthermore,
aid changes correspond closely to my theoretical inter-
est in short-term effects. Following the aid allocation lit-
erature, I use aid commitments in constant USD in the
main analysis (e.g., Dietrich &Wright, 2015; Dreher, Lan-
glotz, &Marchesi, 2017; Hoeffler &Outram, 2011), while
using disbursements for robustness tests. Finally, in ac-
cordance with OECD/DAC definitions, aid flows do not in-
cludemilitary aid, althoughmilitary assistance was given
once to support a UNSC campaign.7
3.2. Predictors
The key predictor of this study is the campaign activity for
a temporary UNSC seat of a given donor in a given year.
As no such indicator—to the best ofmy knowledge—was
available, I sourced newspaper articles covering UNSC
candidacies during 1994–2016 from Factiva. Appendix B
explains the selection of media reports and the cod-
ing procedure in detail. The typical news article in my
database is a statement of support by one country for
the UNSC candidature of another country. I discarded
duplicates (covering the same event) and campaigns for
permanentmemberships and UNSC reform. I then aggre-
gated the data to the country-year format.
My main predictor—Campaign—is a binary indicator
of whether there is at least one media report in which
a donor is reported to bid for a temporary UNSC seat in
a given year. The measure is not ideal, given that some
donorsmay lobbynon-publicly for seats anddata sources
are biased toward English-speaking outlets, but it suc-
cessfully addresses the challenge that both the willing-
ness to run for a seat and the timing of a campaign are
otherwise unobservable. I also verify that donors release
statements in close temporal proximity to their aspired
tenure (Figure B1), with themode of that distribution be-
ing one year prior.
To examine effect heterogeneity, I include multi-
plicative interaction terms between campaign activity
and donor characteristics. To capture Donor Experi-
ence, I compute the natural logarithm of the difference
(t + 1) − f, where f is the founding year of the (first) bilat-
eral aid agency of a donor, and t is the current year. For
all sample years prior to foundation, I set its value to zero.
For robustness tests, I use an alternative data source
of the aid agency founding year (Fuchs & Müller, 2018,
p. 41). To measure donor governance, I use the ICRG
Index of quality of government (The PRS Group, 2015),
while using the VDem Corruption Index (Coppedge et al.,
2016) for robustness. To measure preferences for coop-
eration, I use the Political Globalization index of the KOF
institute (Dreher, 2006), which includes information on
the number of embassies globally, active (I)NGOs, mem-
bership in international organizations, participation in
peacekeeping missions, and treaties signed. In further
analyses, I consider interactions of campaigns with bi-
nary indicators of three regional UN constituencies.
3.3. Control Variables
To mitigate the impact of potential confounders, I in-
clude several time-varying control variables. Without
a mainstay model of donor-year aid growth at hand,
I choose control variables with a view to maximize ob-
servations and thus the power of my statistical tests.
First, macroeconomic shocks may affect the opportu-
3 Excluding the P5 is consistent with the ‘possibility principle’ (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004), because the purported mechanism is not applicable for
these donors.
4 Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) show that both datasets yield virtually identical aggregate multi-bi aid flows in 2006–12 and that the OECD/DAC data
severely underreport multi-bi aid in earlier years. Any remaining discrepancies in aid levels are mitigated due to differencing.
5 Specifically, ln(􏸷y) if 􏸷y ≥ 0 and − ln(−􏸷y) if 􏸷y < 0.
6 Specifically, I conduct a Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity for all transformed aid variables, rejecting the null hypothesis of unit roots in all panels
(p < 1E-4). A Wooldridge test indicates mild autocorrelation (p < 0.05), which can be remedied by including lagged levels of the dependent variable.
7 Based on publicly available media reports, Australia announced military assistance over approximately USD 4 million to the Philippines in 2009–10
(BusinessWorld, 2011).
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nity cost of aid provision and the willingness to cam-
paign for a UNSC seat. I therefore include a binary indi-
cator of financial crisis in the donor country (Laeven &
Valencia, 2013), as well as the percentage rate of GDP
Growth. Second, domestic politics may affect aid poli-
cies and UNSC campaign decisions. For example, the Aus-
tralian opposition leader Tony Abbott (Liberal party) chal-
lenged Kevin Rudd (Labor party) for his decision to run
for a UNSC seat. Skeptical of foreign aid increases in gen-
eral, Abbott promised to abandon the UNSC campaign
and cut aid if elected prime minister (The Age, 2010).
In other cases, governments may have avoided pursuing
certain foreign policies as those policies were controver-
sial among coalition parties. I therefore include binary
indicators for Executive Elections, Left-wing government
ideology, as well as a continuous measure of Govern-
ment Fractionalization—all available from the Database
of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, &
Walsh, 2001).
All regressions further include country-fixed effects
(accounting for unobserved heterogeneity) and year-
fixed effects (accounting for common shocks). To control
for donor size andmean reversion—the tendency of (sta-
tionary) variables to fluctuate around their average—I in-
clude the log-transformed lagged value of the respective
aid flow.
In robustness tests, I consider additional controls re-
lating to events in the neighborhoodof a donor country—
financial crises, armed conflicts, and natural disasters—
which may prompt donors to reconsider aid policies and
UNSC campaign decisions. For example, a donor may re-
spond to emergent conflicts by providing more aid to ad-
dress emergent needs while at the same time vying for
more influence in the UNSC to help resolve these con-
flicts. I count the respective number of these types of
events in all contiguous countries and neighboring coun-
tries no farther away than 1,500 kilometers and normal-
ize by the total number of countries in the neighborhood
to eliminate scaling effects.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and data
sources for all variables. It shows that (non-P5) donors
campaign for a temporary UNSC seat in around 6.4% of
all years and 7.0% when excluding years of tenure and
the two years following it. In addition, campaigning is
widespread. The media reports identify 24 donors with
at least one campaign in 1995–2016.8 This represents
65% of all eligible donors. This ensures that results are
unlikely to be driven by individual countries with fre-
quent campaigns.
3.4. Methods
To adequately capture interdependencies across aid
channels, I conduct seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) analysis. The SURmodel controls for factors jointly
affecting all aid channels by allowing for cross-equation
correlations that appear as parameters in the cross-
equation variance-covariance matrix (Roodman, 2012).
The model is especially suitable under the assumption
of a fixed aid budget, implying that donors which want
to boost one type of aid must decrease another type
of aid to not overspend the budget. Even if aid bud-
gets are freely determined, SUR estimates are consis-
tent (albeit not necessarily efficient). Finally, I cluster




I examine the unconditional relationship between UNSC
campaigning and aid growth graphically. The full regres-
sion results are available in the supplemental appendix
but I do not show them here as I do not find a statistically
significant unconditional relationship for various sets of
control variables and measures of campaigning.
Figure 1 shows for all donors vying for a temporary
UNSC seat the evolution of their total aid in a time win-
dow around the respective UNGA election. Each point
shows for a given campaign for each year relative to the
UNGAelection (x-axis) the logged absolute amount of aid
dollars by which a donor has increased (or decreased)
aid with respect to the previous year (y-axis). The solid
line is the average aid change across all campaigning
donors, along with the 95%-CI. I find no statistically sig-
nificant change in aid growth, as the confidence intervals
include zero.
Figure 2 tracks aid growth around UNGA elections
separately for different aid channels. Multi-bi aid growth
accelerates in the year before the UNGA election, but
this finding does not hold in multivariate analysis, as
shown in the appendix. For the remaining aid channels,
there is no statistically significant growth effect in the
context of UNSC campaigning. A possible interpretation
is that donors are heterogeneous in the ways they use
the various aid channels to support their UNSC candida-
ture, which I will explore now.
Table 2 presents estimation results for the relation-
ship between campaigning for a temporary UNSC seat
and aid growth under different donor characteristics.
I present results for all three estimating equations as a
stacked vector, using a baseline set of control variables
and referring to the supplemental appendix for robust-
ness to other controls.
In Model 1, I find a marginally significant effect in
the difference of campaign effects between experienced
donors and inexperienced donors. For multi-bi aid, I find
the effect to be in the expected direction, but not statis-
tically significant. For bilateral aid, everything else equal,
25 years of donor experience are related to an increase
in bilateral aid growth by aboutUSD200,000—compared
8 These donors include: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Lithuania, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and variable definitions.
Observations Mean Sd Min Max Description
Dependent variables
Bilateral aid growth 567 2.24 18.35 −22.08 22.59 ln(Bit − Bi,t−1 + e) if Bit − Bi,t−1 ≥ 0, − ln(−[Bit − Bi,t−1]) otherwise; Bit refers to bilateral ODA net of multi-bi
aid, sourced from Table DAC1 (OECD, 2018); e is an offset to ensure a non-missing value if growth is zero
Multilateral aid growth 567 2.31 17.81 −21.57 21.58 ln(Mit −Mi,t−1 + e) ifMit −Mi,t−1 ≥ 0, − ln(−[Mit −Mi,t−1]) otherwise;Mit refers to multilateral ODA,
sourced from Table DAC1 (OECD, 2018)
Multi-bi aid growth 420 2.65 17.04 −22.13 22.17 ln(MBit −MBi,t−1 + e) ifMBit −MBi,t−1 ≥ 0, − ln(−[MBit −MBi,t−1]) otherwise;MBit refers to multi-bi aid,
sourced from Table DAC1 for 2006–16 (OECD, 2018) and from the multi-bi aid data for 1990–12
(Eichenauer & Reinsberg, 2017)
Key predictor
Campaign 999 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for Media Reports > 0 (the procedure for identifying media reports on temporary UNSC
seat campaigns is laid out in Appendix B), coded from Factiva
Control variables
Financial crisis 945 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for (contemporaneous) incidence of financial crisis (Laeven & Valencia, 2013)
GDP growth (%) 928 2.64 4.22 −23.10 34.50 Real (contemporaneous) annual GDP growth fromWorld Economic Outlook, sourced from QoG database
(Teorell et al., 2018)
Executive election 944 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for (contemporaneous) executive election from the Database of Political Institutions,
sourced from QoG database (Teorell et al., 2018)
Left-wing government 999 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for left-wing government (largest governing party or the state executive—depending
on the political system), from the Database of Political Institutions, sourced from QoG database
(Teorell et al., 2018)
Government fractionalization 899 0.35 0.27 0.00 0.83 Government fractionalization is defined as the probability that any two legislators are not from the same
party, from the Database of Political Institutions, sourced from QoG database (Teorell et al., 2018)
Regional financial crises 918 0.05 0.11 0.00 1.00 Number of financial crises (Laeven & Valencia, 2013) in the neighborhood of a donor country, divided by
the number of countries in the neighborhood. A neighborhood comprises all contiguous countries and
all states within 1,500 kilometers. Distance data from the CEPII dataset (Mayer & Zignago, 2011)
Regional armed conflicts 918 0.15 0.13 0.00 1.00 Number of armed conflicts based on UCDP/PRIO definition, available from the QoG database (Teorell
et al., 2018), divided by neighborhood size as above
Regional natural disasters 918 0.98 2.03 0.00 15.44 Natural logarithm of people affected by natural disasters (including offset) in the neighborhood divided by
neighborhood size (EM-DAT, 2018)
Moderators
Agency age 837 1.98 1.46 0.00 4.01 Natural logarithm of number of years of existence of the aid agency (formally, 2016-f, with f the founding
year), based on own search
ICRG index 912 0.79 0.17 0.36 1.00 ICRG index of quality of government from the PRS Group, sourced from QoG database (Teorell et al., 2018)
Political globalization 897 77.68 19.67 15.04 98.41 Sub-index on political globalization from the KOF index, sourced from QoG database (Teorell et al., 2018)
















Figure 1. Absolute aid growth in the context of UNSC campaigns. Note: UNSC campaign start year is endogenously deter-
mined by the first media report, whereas the figure tracks aid growth up to three years after the UNGA election year.
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Figure 2. Absolute aid growth in the context of UNSC campaigns for different aid channels. Note: UNSC campaign start
year is endogenously determined by the first media report, whereas the figure tracks aid growth up to three years after
the UNGA election year.
to a fully inexperienced donor—in the context of a UNSC
campaign (p < 0.1).9 Figure 3 plots the marginal effect
of campaigning on bilateral aid growth conditional on
logged years of donor experience. Consistent with theo-
retical expectations, the marginal effect of campaigning
on bilateral aid growth increases with donor experience
and becomes positively significant only for the most ex-
perienced donor.
Model 2 explores the moderating impact of donor
governance. Specifically, decreases in governance qual-
ity let donors increase their multi-bi aid growth to sup-
port a UNSC campaign. Above the mean of governance
quality, the effect of UNSC campaigning on multi-bi aid
growth is not statistically significant, but the effect in-
creases and becomes positively significant at lower gov-
ernance values. For example, multi-bi aid growth in-
creases by about USD 15,000 when reducing governance
quality by one standard deviation (𝜎 = 0.17). Figure 4
shows the conditional marginal effect across the entire
range of governance quality.
In Model 3, I find that political globalization is signif-
icantly related to an acceleration of campaign-induced
multi-bi aid growth. As the globalization index is never
zero for any donor, the effect is best illustrated in an in-
9 Multiply ln(25) with 𝛽 = 3.807 and exponentiate the result.
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Table 2. UNSC campaign and aid growth with basic control variables.
Donor experience Governance quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −8.093 (6.285) −2.378 (18.218) −0.336 (41.956)
Campaign × X 3.807* (2.208) 5.376 (21.474) 0.019 (0.488)
X 0.277 (1.950) 11.556 (19.876) 0.110 (0.294)
Financial crisis −10.045** (4.637) −10.387** (4.643) −9.436** (4.631)
GDP growth 0.222 (0.439) 0.190 (0.444) 0.570 (0.527)
Executive election −3.884 (3.574) −4.477 (3.487) −3.958 (3.580)
Left-wing government 0.583 (1.897) 0.717 (1.849) 1.001 (1.890)
Government fractionalization −4.141 (5.357) −4.306 (5.332) −3.059 (5.671)
Lagged aid level −15.816*** (1.734) −16.053*** (1.717) −17.707*** (1.997)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −8.815 (8.696) 4.789 (23.410) −65.591* (37.205)
Campaign × X 2.676 (2.860) −6.941 (26.743) 0.749* (0.433)
X 2.677 (1.997) −17.106 (22.132) 0.115 (0.289)
Financial crisis 2.782 (5.385) 3.113 (5.292) 2.995 (5.389)
GDP growth 0.584** (0.279) 0.567** (0.279) 0.622* (0.324)
Executive election −3.891 (3.810) −4.256 (3.741) −4.232 (3.670)
Left-wing government 1.548 (1.781) 2.258 (1.766) 2.309 (1.804)
Government fractionalization 1.798 (5.350) 1.779 (5.483) 1.670 (5.872)
Lagged aid level −13.512*** (2.007) −13.242*** (1.941) −13.719*** (2.037)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 1.316 (9.406) 51.894*** (18.888) −141.226*** (53.114)
Campaign × X 0.483 (3.059) −56.127** (22.490) 1.590*** (0.603)
X −3.518* (2.084) −19.821 (24.171) 0.055 (0.440)
Financial crisis −3.709 (3.283) −3.496 (3.367) −1.940 (3.727)
GDP growth 0.510 (0.404) 0.495 (0.408) 0.241 (0.460)
Executive election 6.248 (4.079) 6.135 (3.868) 6.420 (4.071)
Left-wing government 1.373 (1.961) 0.759 (1.917) 1.244 (1.960)
Government fractionalization 4.667 (7.994) 2.978 (7.995) 7.451 (8.316)
Lagged aid level −4.481*** (0.746) −4.251*** (0.716) −4.099*** (0.719)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.25 481 0.24 452 0.25
NM/R2M 481 0.23 481 0.23 452 0.22
NMB/R2MB 383 0.24 383 0.24 354 0.25
𝜌B,M 0.028 (0.046) 0.032 (0.046) 0.027 (0.048)
𝜌B,MB 0.004 (0.053) 0.005 (0.053) −0.024 (0.054)
𝜌M,MB 0.067 (0.054) 0.068 (0.054) 0.062 (0.056)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is a binary indicator, X
is the moderator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Abbreviations in the diagnos-
tics section refer to the number of observations across bilateral aid (NB), multilateral aid (NM), and multi-bi aid (NMB), R-squared, and
cross-equation correlations, respectively. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
teraction plot. Figure 5 shows that the campaign effect is
positively significant only for the most globalized donors,
insignificant for the average donor, and negatively sig-
nificant for inward-oriented donors. Substantively, if po-
litical globalization is increased by one standard devia-
tion (𝜎 = 9.02), multi-bi aid growth accelerates by more
than USD 1.7 million (p < 0.01), while multilateral aid in-
creases by a meager USD 867 (p < 0.1) in the context of
a UNSC campaign.
While the effects of most control variables remain
statistically insignificant, they point into the expected di-
rection. Among the statistically significant controls, I find
that financial crises negatively affect bilateral aid growth
(p< 0.05) and thatmore experienced donors tend tomo-
bilize larger increases of bilateral aid (p < 0.1). For mul-
tilateral aid, I find a significantly positive relationship be-
tween GDP growth and multilateral aid growth (p < 0.1).
For multi-bi aid, none of the controls has a significant ef-












Thick dashed lines give 90% conﬁdence interval.
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Figure 4.Marginal effect of campaigns on multi-bi aid growth conditional on governance quality.
fect. In all equations, lagged aid levels have a statistically
significant effect, indicating mean-reverting time series
(p < 0.01). Overall, model specifications are plausible as
the models explain more than 20% of the variation in all
aid types. Thanks to joint estimation, I can assess the ex-
tent to which aid growth across different channels is cor-
related. The cross-equation correlations are insignificant
in most regressions.
4.2. Instrumental-Variable Design
The results thus far are based on correlations. In the re-
mainder, I consider potential endogeneity of campaign-
ing with respect to aid growth. For example, donor pref-
erences for aid provision and running for a seat may be
affected simultaneously by unobserved factors. There-
fore, I introduce an instrumental variable—the number
of donors in the same constituency that are reported
to vie for the same temporary UNSC seat as a given
donor. This instrument fulfills the relevance criterion be-
cause a donor will need to do more campaigning if many
other donors vie for the same spot. In addition, to the
extent that peer campaigning affects donor-specific aid
growth only through donor campaigning, the instrument
fulfills excludability, conditional on control variables and
fixed effects.
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Figure 5.Marginal effect of campaigns on multi-bi aid growth conditional on political globalization.
Table 3 presents the results, indicating that most pre-
vious findings hold, some being more significant. Donor
experience is a significantly positive predictor of bilateral
aid growth in the context of UNSC campaigns. 25 years
of additional experience now are related to bilateral
aid growth of around USD 50 million (p < 0.05). To
the extent that a donor becomes more internationalized
by a standard deviation, it accelerates its multilateral
aid growth by USD 1,100 (p < 0.1) and its multi-bi aid
growth by aboutUSD 140,000 (p< 0.1) duringUNSC cam-
paigns. Finally, campaigning significantly increases multi-
bi aid growth if governance quality decreases (p < 0.05).
As regards instrument strength, I find that peer cam-
paigning is a positively significant predictor of individ-
ual campaigning, with the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics
being well above the conventional threshold (F > 10).
The estimated sign implies that competition for a sin-
gle UNSC seat drives donors toward intensifying their
own campaigning.
4.3. Robustness Checks
In the appendix, I present the full results for the uncondi-
tional relationship between UNSC campaigning and aid
growth for total aid (Table A1) and different aid chan-
nels (Table A2), before probing the robustness ofmy find-
ings in several ways. First, I extend the set of controls to
also include ‘neighborhood variables,’ which yields the
additional finding that multi-bi aid growth is significantly
positively related to the incidence of regional conflicts,
but has otherwise no effect on the results (Table A3).
My results also are qualitatively unchanged when drop-
ping all control variables from the model, except for the
country-fixed effects and year dummies (Table A4). Fur-
thermore, I successfully replicate all findings using alter-
nativemeasures of themoderator variables (Table A5). In
another robustness test, I explore an alternative lag struc-
ture. When using the one-year lagged campaign mea-
sure, I find that less experienced donors significantly in-
crease multi-bi aid growth to support their UNSC cam-
paigns (p< 0.05). Conversely, political globalization loses
its significant conditioning effect on campaign-induced
multi-bi aid, but now significantly accelerates campaign-
inducedmultilateral aid (p< 0.05). The interaction effect
of UNSC campaigning and governance quality is robust
(Table A6). In another robustness test, I add the three
P5 donors to the sample. This does not affect the re-
sults (Table A7). Except for donor experience, all results
are significant when using aid disbursements rather than
aid commitments (Table A8).10 The relative consistency
of the results implies that donors generally keep their
promises to reward support for their UNSC bids with ad-
ditional aid.
Yet another robustness test conducts all regressions
without country-fixed effects. This alters the interpreta-
tion of the findings because estimated effects also refer
to differences across donors, rather than inter-temporal
differences within the same donors. For slow-moving
variables, effects generally refer to cross-donor differ-
ences. Replicating the main analysis using pooled regres-
sions, I find the main results to be remarkably robust
(Table A9).
Finally, again using pooled regressions, I explore po-
tential effect heterogeneity across three regional con-
stituencies, notably EEG, WEOG, and APG (Table A10).
I find that Asian donors increase bilateral aid to support
10 When lagging the campaign indicator, I obtain a significant conditional effect of donor experience on multi-bi aid growth, which may be due to delays
in the actual disbursement of committed aid.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 127–154 137
Table 3. Instrumental variable analysis.
Donor experience Governance quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −18.170** (7.799) −19.289 (21.333) 5.941 (42.521)
Campaign × X 5.513** (2.363) 19.773 (23.675) −0.104 (0.498)
X 0.621 (1.945) 12.919 (19.828) 0.162 (0.296)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −10.929 (9.495) 5.847 (24.303) −67.166* (36.670)
Campaign × X 3.036 (2.982) −7.839 (27.489) 0.780* (0.426)
X 2.753 (2.008) −17.192 (22.106) 0.103 (0.288)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign −4.192 (9.386) 44.190* (23.090) −118.837** (57.898)
Campaign × X 1.008 (2.749) −50.911** (25.581) 1.313* (0.675)
X −3.534* (2.068) −17.401 (24.245) 0.070 (0.440)
Campaign
Peer campaigning 0.555*** (0.042) 0.543*** (0.038) 0.540*** (0.041)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.25 481 0.24 452 0.25
NM/R2M 481 0.24 481 0.23 452 0.22
NMB/R2MB 383 0.24 383 0.24 354 0.25
𝜌B,M 0.031 (0.046) 0.032 (0.046) 0.026 (0.048)
𝜌B,MB 0.009 (0.053) 0.008 (0.053) −0.210 (0.054)
𝜌M,MB 0.069 (0.054) 0.067 (0.054) 0.060 (0.056)
F-statistic 177.22 201.62 170.98
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is a binary indicator, X is
the moderator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Baseline set of controls included
in all equations. The instrument—peer campaigning—is defined as the number of other donors in the same constituency vying for the
same seat. Abbreviations in the diagnostics section refer to the number of observations across bilateral aid (NB), multilateral aid (NM),
and multi-bi aid (NMB), R-squared, and cross-equation correlations, respectively. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
a UNSC campaign (p < 0.05), while WEOG donors tend
to reduce it (p < 0.1). I find no significant conditional ef-
fects for EEG donors, which likely is the result of under-
powered tests.
5. Conclusion
Do countries use foreign aid to support their campaigns
for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council? I found
some robust evidence of campaign-induced aid growth
for some aid channels and under some circumstances.
In particular, as donor experience increases, bilateral aid
growth increases, whereas multi-bi aid growth tends to
decline. Conversely, multi-bi aid growth increases with
declining quality of governance and with the level of in-
ternationalization of a given donor.
A noteworthy limitation of this research is that some
findings can still be interpreted in variousways. For exam-
ple,while internationalization boostsmulti-bi aid growth,
it does not seem to affect bilateral aid growth. One in-
terpretation is that there really is no effect on bilateral
aid growth, but another one is that bilateral aid declines
but the analysis fails to produce a statistically signifi-
cant effect, for example due to measurement error. De-
spite best efforts, the data collection might be incom-
plete, which would generate measurement error. Other
sources of insignificant effects include under-powered
tests due to short time series as well as donor het-
erogeneity. These are common challenges of quantita-
tive analysis that also this article cannot defy. Nonethe-
less, the above analysis produced results that are re-
markably robust against several modifications, including
instrumental-variable estimation.
Albeit necessarily preliminary, these findings suggest
interesting avenues for future research. They demon-
strate that donors care about UNSC membership. Ex-
isting studies emphasize the aid rewards for recipient
countries during their temporary UNSC tenure. Future
research could examine how aid flows evolve over the
lifetime of a UNSC campaign, given that donors (includ-
ing the ones that do not get elected) are likely to lessen
aid effort once uncertainty is resolved after the out-
come of a UNGA election. Studying how aid evolves
during UNSC tenure would also hint to donor motiva-
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tions in this context and specifically which donors use
aid for private gain versus fostering international soli-
darity. In this context, further research into donors of
specific UN constituencies would be promising. For EEG
donors, qualitative research would be necessary given
the lack of long time-series data (Szent-Iványi, Reinsberg,
& Lightfoot, 2018). Capturing the donor perspective, fu-
ture research could also examine the choice of instru-
ments other than aid for supporting UNSC campaigns.
Research could also explore which recipients stand to
gain most from donor campaigns for UNSC seats. Ul-
timately, researchers should examine the effectiveness
of campaign-induced aid. Although previous research
finds that aid extended to developing countries during
their temporary UNSC tenure is less effective (Dreher,
Eichenauer, & Gehring, 2016), this does not need to be
the case for campaign-induced aid for which donor mo-
tives are less clear.
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Appendix A. Robustness tests.
Table A1. Unconditional effect of UNSC campaigning on total aid growth.
Media reports > 0 ln (1 +Media reports) Media reports t−1 > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Column header) 0.159 0.337 −0.110 1.420 1.641 −0.971 1.517 1.666 1.396
(3.656) (3.622) (2.929) (2.948) (2.812) (2.359) (2.264) (2.284) (2.839)
Financial crisis 1.609 2.151 1.709 2.091 1.633 2.193
(3.276) (3.261) (3.324) (3.224) (3.309) (3.308)
GDP growth −0.047 −0.021 −0.052 −0.022 −0.048 −0.019
(0.157) (0.168) (0.157) (0.169) (0.158) (0.166)
Executive election 0.033 −0.009 0.084 −0.035 −0.053 −0.082
(2.780) (2.747) (2.800) (2.734) (2.765) (2.758)
Left-wing government 2.261 2.084 2.288 2.033 2.276 2.149
(1.550) (1.736) (1.524) (1.739) (1.513) (1.680)
Government fractionalization 0.861 1.757 1.165 1.671 1.119 1.908
(3.916) (3.978) (3.869) (3.955) (3.812) (3.913)
Regional crises −1.500 −1.713 −1.070
(11.647) (11.755) (12.118)
Regional conflicts 2.572 2.606 2.633
(3.996) (3.929) (3.908)
Regional disasters 0.304 0.263 0.355
(0.526) (0.519) (0.630)
Lagged aid level 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.467*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.465*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.469***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47
Observations 814 753 709 814 753 709 814 753 709
Notes: Campaign is either a binary indicator of media reports (column 1–3), the logged number of media reports (column 4–6), or the lagged binary indicator (column 7–9). Significance level: *** p < .01.
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Table A2. Unconditional effect of UNSC campaigning on aid growth for different aid channels.
Media reports > 0 ln (1 +Media reports) Media reports t−1 > 0
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
(Column header) 2.289 (2.943) 2.440 (2.363) 0.441 (2.978)
Financial crisis −10.242** (4.611) −10.139** (4.591) −10.355** (4.707)
GDP growth 0.208 (0.440) 0.194 (0.439) 0.225 (0.449)
Executive election −4.459 (3.465) −4.351 (3.467) −4.259 (3.469)
Left-wing government 0.782 (1.856) 0.767 (1.851) 0.714 (1.853)
Government fractionalization −4.331 (5.397) −4.108 (5.387) −4.482 (5.503)
Lagged aid level −15.994*** (1.729) −16.002*** (1.730) −16.001*** (1.722)
Multilateral aid growth
(Column header) −1.256 (3.060) −0.844 (2.555) −2.712 (2.832)
Financial crisis 2.898 (5.337) 2.863 (5.315) 3.524 (5.414)
GDP growth 0.541* (0.279) 0.541* (0.281) 0.568** (0.280)
Executive election −4.290 (3.794) −4.360 (3.787) −4.566 (3.767)
Left-wing government 2.164 (1.757) 2.187 (1.756) 2.106 (1.763)
Government fractionalization 1.826 (5.457) 1.795 (5.489) 1.302 (5.454)
Lagged aid level −13.306*** (1.935) −13.317*** (1.933) −13.450*** (1.949)
Multi-bi aid growth
(Column header) 2.550 (3.431) 1.190 (2.291) 0.709 (3.582)
Financial crisis −3.905 (3.380) −3.672 (3.373) −3.815 (3.381)
GDP growth 0.505 (0.405) 0.502 (0.407) 0.514 (0.405)
Executive election 6.111 (3.971) 6.285 (3.932) 6.395 (3.921)
Left-wing government 0.842 (1.928) 0.736 (1.916) 0.698 (1.912)
Government fractionalization 3.755 (8.006) 3.481 (8.025) 3.126 (7.968)
Lagged aid level −4.268*** (0.716) −4.286*** (0.714) −4.320*** (0.707)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.24 481 0.24 481 0.24
NM/R2M 481 0.23 481 0.23 481 0.23
NMB/R2MB 383 0.23 383 0.23 383 0.23
𝜌B,M 0.031 (0.046) 0.031 (0.046) 0.031 (0.046)
𝜌B,MB 0.002 (0.053) 0.001 (0.053) 0.003 (0.053)
𝜌M,MB 0.068 (0.054) 0.067 (0.054) 0.066 (0.054)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is either a binary indica-
tor of media reports (column 1), the logged number of media reports (column 2), or the lagged binary indicator (column 3). Significance
levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A3. UNSC campaign and aid growth with additional control variables.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −8.158 (6.300) −1.672 (18.175) −3.468 (40.753)
Campaign × X 3.858* (2.204) 4.556 (21.407) 0.056 (0.473)
X 0.318 (1.954) 11.869 (19.847) 0.103 (0.294)
Financial crisis −10.141** (4.580) −10.597** (4.548) −9.475** (4.610)
GDP growth 0.205 (0.450) 0.170 (0.455) 0.565 (0.544)
Executive election −3.964 (3.590) −4.553 (3.506) −4.094 (3.604)
Left-wing government 0.455 (1.890) 0.593 (1.843) 0.867 (1.882)
Government fractionalization −4.218 (5.362) −4.426 (5.335) −3.167 (5.688)
Regional crises −4.165 (12.090) −5.048 (12.221) −4.699 (12.557)
Regional conflicts 5.290 (7.432) 5.437 (7.438) 8.009 (7.549)
Regional disasters 0.475 (1.151) 0.336 (1.162) 0.733 (1.201)
Lagged aid level −15.798*** (1.731) −16.048*** (1.715) −17.694*** (1.983)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −8.491 (8.670) 4.086 (23.136) −62.985* (36.791)
Campaign × X 2.474 (2.824) −6.412 (26.381) 0.718* (0.427)
X 2.710 (1.998) −16.188 (22.004) 0.128 (0.288)
Financial crisis 2.229 (5.367) 2.540 (5.279) 2.778 (5.391)
GDP growth 0.666** (0.283) 0.646** (0.283) 0.704** (0.326)
Executive election −3.675 (3.789) −4.003 (3.731) −4.059 (3.651)
Left-wing government 1.515 (1.778) 2.220 (1.758) 2.293 (1.802)
Government fractionalization 0.817 (5.395) 0.816 (5.514) 0.999 (5.923)
Regional crises 5.661 (8.975) 5.415 (8.870) 6.094 (8.880)
Regional conflicts 4.440 (7.416) 4.203 (7.452) 2.469 (7.577)
Regional disasters −1.862* (1.128) −1.890* (1.127) −1.361 (1.202)
Lagged aid level −13.615*** (1.991) −13.347*** (1.927) −13.763*** (2.028)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 2.363 (9.065) 50.414*** (18.254) −149.786*** (50.562)
Campaign × X 0.205 (2.961) −54.216** (21.791) 1.692*** (0.574)
X −3.572* (2.056) −18.753 (24.020) 0.014 (0.440)
Financial crisis −1.889 (3.604) −1.755 (3.670) 0.367 (3.934)
GDP growth 0.642 (0.407) 0.622 (0.407) 0.403 (0.493)
Executive election 6.152 (4.083) 6.054 (3.869) 6.179 (4.075)
Left-wing government 1.144 (1.962) 0.509 (1.916) 1.001 (1.971)
Government fractionalization 2.257 (8.115) 0.650 (8.104) 5.553 (8.457)
Regional crises 16.746 (10.186) 15.915 (10.254) 17.055* (9.842)
Regional conflicts 13.487** (6.181) 13.565** (6.083) 12.347* (6.611)
Regional disasters −1.689 (1.165) −1.609 (1.133) −0.692 (1.244)
Lagged aid level −4.584*** (0.734) −4.348*** (0.704) −4.183*** (0.710)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.25 481 0.24 452 0.26
NM/R2M 481 0.24 481 0.23 452 0.23
NMB/R2MB 383 0.25 383 0.26 354 0.26
𝜌B,M 0.030 (0.046) 0.034 (0.046) 0.029 (0.048)
𝜌B,MB 0.006 (0.053) 0.007 (0.052) −0.026 (0.054)
𝜌M,MB 0.052 (0.054) 0.054 (0.054) 0.052 (0.056)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary, X is the mod-
erator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. For the two countries for which the
neighborhood is empty (Australia and New Zealand), I set the respective values for the three regional variables to zero to avoid a drop
in observations. Standard errors clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A4. UNSC campaign and aid growth without control variables.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −9.298 (5.872) −4.470 (18.172) 2.640 (41.178)
Campaign × X 4.295** (2.114) 7.917 (21.438) −0.010 (0.480)
X −0.081 (1.881) 7.376 (20.116) 0.126 (0.296)
Lagged aid level −15.511*** (1.761) −15.746*** (1.749) −17.438*** (2.026)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −9.315 (8.403) 3.267 (23.585) −54.172 (37.156)
Campaign × X 2.830 (2.802) −5.430 (27.088) 0.617 (0.433)
X 2.720 (1.936) −7.083 (21.526) 0.182 (0.276)
Lagged aid level −13.894*** (1.980) −13.637*** (1.880) −14.075*** (2.020)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 2.044 (9.254) 56.936*** (18.921) −146.578*** (52.279)
Campaign × X 0.202 (2.997) −61.710*** (22.260) 1.647*** (0.593)
X −3.387* (2.036) −9.094 (24.533) 0.055 (0.433)
Lagged aid level −4.237*** (0.723) −3.998*** (0.690) −4.010*** (0.706)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 493 0.23 493 0.22 457 0.24
NM/R2M 493 0.23 493 0.22 457 0.22
NMB/R2MB 391 0.22 391 0.23 358 0.24
𝜌B,M 0.021 (0.046) 0.025 (0.046) 0.031 (0.048)
𝜌B,MB −0.004 (0.052) −0.002 (0.052) −0.032 (0.053)
𝜌M,MB 0.093* (0.054) 0.094* (0.054) 0.072 (0.056)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary, X is the mod-
erator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors clustered on countries.
Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A5. Different operationalization of moderator variables.
Donor experience VDem corruption Neighborhood size
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −10.359 (6.774) 1.983 (4.121) 1.842 (3.969)
Campaign × X 4.054* (2.174) 7.979 (24.426) 0.043 (0.244)
X −0.078 (1.180) −80.863* (42.169) −1.296*** (0.248)
Financial crisis −9.685** (4.675) −7.685 (4.786) −10.252** (4.609)
GDP growth 0.194 (0.444) 0.148 (0.456) 0.212 (0.442)
Executive election −3.495 (3.621) −4.712 (3.388) −4.567 (3.543)
Left-wing government 0.474 (1.882) 0.576 (1.842) 0.834 (1.852)
Government fractionalization −4.073 (5.339) −3.920 (5.237) −4.393 (5.432)
Lagged aid level −15.581*** (1.804) −15.794*** (1.773) −16.018*** (1.748)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −6.274 (8.893) 0.863 (3.951) −0.723 (4.065)
Campaign × X 1.435 (2.723) −18.235 (30.258) −0.050 (0.292)
X 0.669 (1.111) −37.057 (43.678) −0.480*** (0.163)
Financial crisis 2.505 (5.382) 3.104 (5.542) 2.911 (5.346)
GDP growth 0.567** (0.282) 0.676** (0.286) 0.536* (0.281)
Executive election −3.890 (3.891) −4.252 (3.792) −4.165 (3.849)
Left-wing government 1.917 (1.771) 1.892 (1.762) 2.104 (1.773)
Government fractionalization 2.003 (5.404) 1.580 (5.482) 1.901 (5.467)
Lagged aid level −13.134*** (1.944) −13.291*** (2.008) −13.271*** (1.932)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign −1.951 (9.689) −1.863 (4.236) −1.554 (4.327)
Campaign × X 1.388 (3.012) 75.563** (29.841) 0.476* (0.274)
X −1.544 (1.195) −35.449 (54.308) −0.123 (0.171)
Financial crisis −3.656 (3.294) −3.405 (3.579) −3.834 (3.448)
GDP growth 0.500 (0.402) 0.441 (0.411) 0.557 (0.407)
Executive election 6.262 (4.102) 5.638 (3.969) 5.479 (4.083)
Left-wing government 1.035 (1.930) 0.432 (1.942) 1.125 (1.939)
Government fractionalization 3.530 (7.982) 2.445 (8.194) 2.999 (8.009)
Lagged aid level −4.410*** (0.746) −4.250*** (0.737) −4.255*** (0.710)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 475 0.24 459 0.25 481 0.24
NM/R2M 475 0.23 459 0.24 481 0.23
NMB/R2MB 383 0.24 372 0.24 383 0.24
𝜌B,M 0.022 (0.046) 0.021 (0.047) 0.031 (0.046)
𝜌B,MB 0.001 (0.053) −0.001 (0.054) 0.004 (0.053)
𝜌M,MB 0.067 (0.054) 0.065 (0.055) 0.070 (0.054)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary, X is the mod-
erator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Donor experience was taken from Fuchs
and Müller (2018). Standard errors clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A6. Lagged effect of donor campaigning.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign 8.141* (4.837) 8.314 (17.311) 44.588 (38.068)
Campaign × X −2.873 (1.933) −9.352 (20.491) −0.532 (0.450)
X 0.074 (1.944) 13.410 (19.779) 0.189 (0.300)
Financial crisis −10.291** (4.766) −10.440** (4.756) −9.628** (4.815)
GDP growth 0.225 (0.452) 0.196 (0.451) 0.602 (0.542)
Executive election −4.258 (3.513) −4.343 (3.481) −4.021 (3.630)
Left-wing government 0.901 (1.909) 0.714 (1.855) 0.890 (1.875)
Government fractionalization −4.849 (5.532) −4.456 (5.461) −3.671 (5.758)
Lagged aid level −15.756*** (1.734) −15.984*** (1.710) −17.575*** (1.963)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −6.046 (6.928) −14.365 (17.798) −80.959** (32.406)
Campaign × X 1.150 (2.399) 13.858 (20.695) 0.912** (0.382)
X 2.630 (1.987) −18.184 (22.000) 0.027 (0.293)
Financial crisis 3.296 (5.390) 3.640 (5.353) 4.189 (5.347)
GDP growth 0.604** (0.280) 0.608** (0.282) 0.611* (0.326)
Executive election −4.614 (3.698) −4.466 (3.703) −4.190 (3.594)
Left-wing government 1.514 (1.808) 2.101 (1.775) 2.094 (1.796)
Government fractionalization 1.318 (5.407) 1.328 (5.460) 1.049 (5.835)
Lagged aid level −13.693*** (2.015) −13.321*** (1.964) −13.818*** (2.053)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 20.603*** (7.748) 32.545* (18.125) 33.656 (64.446)
Campaign × X −6.483** (2.724) −36.594* (21.123) −0.352 (0.731)
X −4.084** (2.063) −25.281 (23.736) 0.075 (0.443)
Financial crisis −2.280 (3.375) −3.516 (3.357) −2.667 (3.666)
GDP growth 0.523 (0.403) 0.488 (0.401) 0.204 (0.452)
Executive election 6.663* (3.990) 6.563* (3.875) 6.613* (4.020)
Left-wing government 1.341 (1.932) 0.525 (1.906) 1.510 (1.967)
Government fractionalization 3.356 (7.971) 2.371 (8.019) 8.812 (8.225)
Lagged aid level −4.594*** (0.717) −4.373*** (0.712) −4.141*** (0.723)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.24 481 0.24 452 0.26
NM/R2M 481 0.23 481 0.23 452 0.23
NMB/R2MB 383 0.24 383 0.24 354 0.24
𝜌B,M 0.033 (0.046) 0.032 (0.046) 0.032 (0.048)
𝜌B,MB −0.004 (0.053) 0.000 (0.053) −0.020 (0.054)
𝜌M,MB 0.065 (0.054) 0.067 (0.054) 0.063 (0.056)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary and lagged by
one year, X is the moderator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors
clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A7. Including P5 observations in the sample.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −9.230 (6.130) −7.278 (18.357) 4.525 (41.778)
Campaign × X 4.226* (2.161) 11.220 (21.671) −0.037 (0.486)
X 0.989 (1.785) 4.539 (18.684) 0.131 (0.287)
Financial crisis −11.882*** (3.852) −11.987*** (3.836) −11.273*** (3.842)
GDP growth 0.184 (0.420) 0.160 (0.426) 0.490 (0.512)
Executive election −0.747 (3.202) −1.066 (3.187) −0.743 (3.213)
Left-wing government −0.027 (1.782) 0.223 (1.744) 0.482 (1.778)
Government fractionalization −4.945 (5.298) −5.256 (5.283) −4.196 (5.584)
Lagged aid level −16.589*** (1.729) −16.858*** (1.714) −18.469*** (1.978)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −8.969 (8.395) 5.141 (23.961) −69.063* (35.260)
Campaign × X 2.771 (2.792) −7.076 (27.469) 0.788* (0.413)
X 3.257* (1.803) −33.712 (20.623) 0.074 (0.274)
Financial crisis 3.992 (4.613) 4.743 (4.512) 4.346 (4.634)
GDP growth 0.701** (0.273) 0.716*** (0.274) 0.772** (0.316)
Executive election 2.165 (3.434) 2.149 (3.369) 2.003 (3.399)
Left-wing government 2.442 (1.660) 3.235* (1.652) 3.390** (1.677)
Government fractionalization 4.179 (5.187) 3.701 (5.284) 3.568 (5.599)
Lagged aid level −14.743*** (2.038) −14.319*** (1.964) −14.875*** (2.042)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 1.285 (9.439) 51.470*** (18.294) −149.111*** (52.252)
Campaign × X 0.516 (3.045) −55.608** (21.693) 1.681*** (0.593)
X −2.190 (1.976) −29.547 (23.160) −0.157 (0.468)
Financial crisis −0.432 (4.067) −0.090 (4.018) 1.232 (4.192)
GDP growth 0.521 (0.403) 0.516 (0.404) 0.281 (0.461)
Executive election 2.575 (3.572) 2.499 (3.496) 2.988 (3.599)
Left-wing government 1.281 (1.820) 0.843 (1.772) 1.180 (1.820)
Government fractionalization 2.645 (7.641) 0.860 (7.665) 5.858 (7.935)
Lagged aid level −3.967*** (0.655) −3.902*** (0.651) −3.796*** (0.659)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 547 0.24 547 0.23 515 0.25
NM/R2M 547 0.23 547 0.22 515 0.22
NMB/R2MB 437 0.21 437 0.22 405 0.22
𝜌B,M 0.064 (0.043) 0.069 (0.043) 0.056 (0.045)
𝜌B,MB 0.006 (0.049) 0.008 (0.049) −0.009 (0.05)
𝜌M,MB 0.087* (0.051) 0.085* (0.051) 0.086* (0.052)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary, X is the mod-
erator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors clustered on countries.
Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A8. Using aid disbursements rather than aid commitments.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −2.848 (4.785) −1.698 (13.497) −9.278 (19.105)
Campaign × X 1.578 (1.807) 3.090 (16.516) 0.122 (0.231)
X 1.400 (1.747) −10.354 (18.503) 0.150 (0.192)
Financial crisis −2.489 (4.191) −2.450 (4.092) −1.731 (4.073)
GDP growth 0.608* (0.369) 0.535 (0.337) 0.759** (0.351)
Executive election −1.633 (2.639) −2.273 (2.548) −1.997 (2.583)
Left-wing government −0.955 (1.728) −0.635 (1.683) −0.727 (1.725)
Government fractionalization −13.103** (5.136) −13.983*** (5.327) −11.858** (5.419)
Lagged aid level −5.369*** (1.207) −5.521*** (1.190) −6.122*** (1.259)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −2.280 (4.546) −4.778 (11.923) −30.520* (18.319)
Campaign × X 1.312 (1.739) 7.399 (14.590) 0.377* (0.221)
X 0.649 (1.628) −30.903* (18.088) 0.127 (0.185)
Financial crisis 8.983** (3.690) 7.860** (3.603) 8.598** (3.566)
GDP growth 0.493** (0.216) 0.289 (0.204) 0.323 (0.228)
Executive election −5.748** (2.683) −4.974* (2.634) −4.763* (2.664)
Left-wing government −0.062 (1.558) 0.061 (1.534) 0.050 (1.581)
Government fractionalization 2.593 (4.269) 1.962 (4.282) 3.176 (4.573)
Lagged aid level −6.786*** (1.170) −7.427*** (1.204) −7.065*** (1.231)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 12.164* (7.165) 53.331*** (19.296) −140.347** (61.275)
Campaign × X −2.869 (2.524) −57.431** (22.965) 1.589** (0.693)
X −5.632*** (2.101) −17.606 (24.559) 0.376 (0.412)
Financial crisis 0.635 (5.500) 0.501 (5.492) 0.621 (5.376)
GDP growth 0.529 (0.392) 0.520 (0.395) 0.301 (0.465)
Executive election 3.563 (4.113) 3.680 (4.087) 4.777 (4.145)
Left-wing government 3.051 (1.951) 2.019 (1.924) 1.955 (1.979)
Government fractionalization 9.848 (8.001) 8.048 (8.093) 10.839 (8.386)
Lagged aid level −4.775*** (0.759) −4.397*** (0.736) −4.299*** (0.748)
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 590 0.18 628 0.18 594 0.19
NM/R2M 590 0.19 628 0.19 594 0.18
NMB/R2MB 386 0.23 388 0.23 358 0.23
𝜌B,M 0.078* (0.043) 0.070 (0.042) 0.065 (0.043)
𝜌B,MB −0.060 (0.051) −0.065 (0.050) −0.086* (0.051)
𝜌M,MB −0.004 (0.051) −0.007 (0.051) −0.016 (0.052)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary, X is the mod-
erator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors clustered on countries.
Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table A9. Pooled SUR estimations.
Donor experience Government quality Political globalization
(1) (2) (3)
Bilateral aid growth
Campaign −10.000 (6.101) 7.008 (19.466) 6.516 (34.872)
Campaign × X 4.112* (2.160) −7.143 (22.805) −0.072 (0.408)
X 0.647 (0.728) 13.583 (8.960) 0.145 (0.114)
Financial crisis −8.866* (4.814) −8.546* (4.856) −8.739* (4.931)
GDP growth 0.272 (0.424) 0.219 (0.419) 0.693 (0.512)
Executive election −4.459 (3.808) −5.597 (3.789) −4.958 (3.682)
Left-wing government 0.539 (1.751) 0.546 (1.771) 1.019 (1.842)
Government fractionalization 1.847 (3.084) 0.101 (3.384) 3.861 (3.177)
Lagged aid level −3.167*** (0.679) −3.181*** (0.693) −3.306*** (0.866)
EEG −11.755** (4.850) −12.245*** (4.749) −17.752*** (5.684)
WEOG −7.711** (3.002) −9.454*** (3.164) −9.674*** (3.447)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign −7.104 (7.707) 13.674 (21.645) −53.925 (36.596)
Campaign × X 2.829 (2.646) −15.005 (24.669) 0.641 (0.427)
X −0.056 (0.695) −1.928 (8.589) 0.267** (0.121)
Financial crisis 3.423 (5.781) 2.940 (5.750) 3.132 (5.910)
GDP growth 0.499** (0.249) 0.493** (0.250) 0.576* (0.303)
Executive election −5.982 (3.913) −6.683* (3.767) −7.338** (3.637)
Left-wing government 1.798 (1.684) 2.072 (1.691) 1.721 (1.760)
Government fractionalization 3.700 (3.132) 4.056 (3.447) 4.190 (3.215)
Lagged aid level −1.975*** (0.629) −1.963*** (0.616) −3.321*** (0.878)
EEG 2.123 (4.430) 0.965 (4.430) −4.002 (4.722)
WEOG −1.408 (3.276) −1.324 (3.345) −5.724* (3.456)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign −0.266 (8.058) 50.215*** (15.033) −91.455* (51.564)
Campaign × X 1.790 (2.637) −52.535*** (18.481) 1.079* (0.583)
X −0.098 (0.735) 16.653* (9.133) −0.096 (0.137)
Financial crisis −4.982 (4.271) −4.448 (4.126) −4.377 (4.367)
GDP growth 0.370 (0.408) 0.220 (0.397) 0.188 (0.527)
Executive election 3.934 (4.170) 2.836 (3.909) 3.390 (4.081)
Left-wing government 1.842 (1.822) 1.479 (1.834) 2.425 (1.854)
Government fractionalization 6.058* (3.273) 3.664 (3.497) 7.650** (3.356)
Lagged aid level −1.917*** (0.460) −2.229*** (0.479) −1.843*** (0.526)
EEG −9.261* (5.261) −8.571* (5.122) −15.877*** (5.506)
WEOG −5.602 (3.798) −6.630* (3.797) −8.900** (3.786)
Country-fixed effects no no no no no no
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 590 0.17 628 0.18 594 0.19
NM/R2M 590 0.19 628 0.19 594 0.18
NMB/R2MB 386 0.23 388 0.23 358 0.22
𝜌B,M 0.080* (0.043) 0.069 (0.042) 0.066 (0.043)
𝜌B,MB −0.065 (0.051) −0.073 (0.050) −0.080 (0.052)
𝜌M,MB −0.007 (0.051) −0.004 (0.051) −0.010 (0.052)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary and lagged by
one year, X is the moderator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors
clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Campaign 2.447 (3.246) 9.498* (5.364) −1.946 (3.244)
Campaign × X −7.736 (8.332) −11.394* (6.282) 16.623** (6.507)
X −2.954 (3.189) −0.583 (2.112) 3.700 (3.282)
Financial crisis −7.568 (5.001) −7.609 (5.088) −8.283 (5.039)
GDP growth 0.375 (0.443) 0.346 (0.426) 0.298 (0.417)
Executive election −3.397 (4.119) −5.104 (4.096) −4.430 (3.833)
Left-wing government −0.405 (1.726) −0.342 (1.694) 0.007 (1.726)
Government fractionalization 0.551 (2.984) −0.157 (2.957) 0.918 (3.001)
Lagged aid level −2.250*** (0.617) −1.855*** (0.499) −2.224*** (0.500)
Multilateral aid growth
Campaign 0.749 (2.958) 1.474 (5.816) 0.249 (3.064)
Campaign × X 0.082 (10.098) −1.260 (6.637) 2.009 (8.098)
X 3.174 (2.398) −2.115 (2.140) 1.131 (3.690)
Financial crisis 3.409 (5.716) 2.901 (5.652) 2.796 (5.764)
GDP growth 0.502** (0.250) 0.489** (0.249) 0.500** (0.248)
Executive election −6.308 (3.988) −6.526* (3.797) −6.090 (3.874)
Left-wing government 1.701 (1.674) 2.095 (1.618) 2.125 (1.653)
Government fractionalization 3.282 (3.070) 3.850 (3.023) 3.852 (3.078)
Lagged aid level −1.869*** (0.614) −2.048*** (0.579) −2.241*** (0.535)
Multi-bi aid growth
Campaign 4.782 (3.181) 11.277* (5.864) 3.950 (3.215)
Campaign × X 1.794 (5.712) −7.920 (6.750) 7.486 (8.881)
X −4.168 (3.640) −0.086 (2.852) 4.307 (4.143)
Financial crisis −6.011 (4.277) −5.909 (4.404) −5.094 (4.341)
GDP growth 0.379 (0.410) 0.379 (0.402) 0.368 (0.397)
Executive election 4.111 (4.335) 3.570 (4.261) 3.774 (4.086)
Left-wing government 1.378 (1.786) 1.305 (1.764) 1.634 (1.790)
Government fractionalization 4.703 (3.111) 4.380 (3.110) 5.436* (3.238)
Lagged aid level −1.828*** (0.453) -1.644*** (0.421) −1.735*** (0.409)
Country-fixed effects no no no no no no
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
NB/R2B 481 0.11 481 0.12 481 0.13
NM/R2M 481 0.12 481 0.12 481 0.11
NMB/R2MB 383 0.15 383 0.16 383 0.16
𝜌B,M 0.004 (0.047) −0.003 (0.047) −0.001 (0.047)
𝜌B,MB 0.040 (0.052) 0.031 (0.052) 0.027 (0.052)
𝜌M,MB 0.110** (0.051) 0.105** (0.051) 0.108** (0.051)
Notes: System of equations estimated simultaneously with dependent variables shown in row heads. Campaign is binary and lagged by
one year, X is the moderator in the respective column header, and Campaign × X the multiplicative interaction term. Standard errors
clustered on countries. Significance levels: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Appendix B. Coding protocol and illustrative examples.
B1. A Glance at the Raw Data
Description of the variables (most relevant variables highlighted in bold font):
• Date: exact date of media report
• Constituency: name of the UN constituency
• Term: term for which donor seeks UNSC membership (if not mentioned, then this value was imputed from other
sources)
• Permanent: 1 if donor is seeking permanent UNSC membership (observations with Permanent = 1 discarded)
• NonPerm: 1 if donor is seeking non-permanent UNSC membership
• iso3A: country code of the donor seeking UNSC seat
• BidA: 1 if press report states that donor seeks support for its UNSC candidature (observationswith BidA=0discarded)
• Comp1: country code of first competitor also vying for UNSC seat in the same term if the media report mentions it
• Comp2: country code of any second competitor if media report mentions it (these variables are not used as they are
likely incomplete and other sources should be used)
• AidA: 1 if donor is reported to commit to aid increase to unspecified recipients in the same media report
• AidAtoB: 1 if donor is reported to commit aid increase to specified recipient (iso3B) in the same media report
• TradeAgreement: 1 if donor is reported to promise better trade relations with specified recipient (iso3B) in the same
media report
• PKOengage: 1 if donor is reported to commit more engagement in UN peacekeeping in the same report
• RequestSupport: 1 if donor solicits support for its UNSC candidature from (un)specified recipient(s)
• iso3B: country code of supporting country
• SupportA: 1 if media report mentions iso3B supporting UNSC candidature for iso3A
• DenySupport: 1 if media report mentions iso3B denying support for UNSC candidature of iso3A
• SupportAB: 1 if report mentions commitment of mutual support for UNSC bids between iso3A and iso3B
• AidDemanded: 1 if report mentions iso3B asking for increased development cooperation from iso3A
• TradeDemanded: 1 if the report mentions iso3B asking for increased trade cooperation with iso3A
• Quotes: Any key quotes from the article; also codes exhaustively for instances of support for candidacies in other
international venues
• NewsID: Factiva news ID
• Media report (derived variable): 1 if document is a relevant media report (NonPerm = 1 and BidA = 1) in which the
donor requests support or receives it (RequestSupport = 1, SupportA = 1, or SupportAB = 1). Used for aggregation
to the donor-year level and then called Campaigns.
B2. The Data Collection Process
A media report is relevant in the context of my research question if it contains explicit mentioning of the aspiration for
temporary UNSC membership of a given country. A media report is irrelevant under any of the following conditions: 1) the
report type is an opinion piece that does not present any new information previously coded; 2) the article discusses insti-
tutional reform of the UNSC; 3) a country vies for permanent membership in the UNSC.
To identify as many relevant source documents as possible, I tried several combinations of search strings and found the
following to yield the best results in terms of covering many relevant media reports while discarding the irrelevant ones
(based on a glance at the first hundred hits):
united nations security council near7 (candidacy or candidate or candidature or non-permanent member not perma-
nent or temporary seat ormembership or election or campaign or competition or bid) near5 (win or won or lose or lost
or announce or vote or elect or select or choose or chosen or assume or support or assist or encourage)
Further search options in the Factiva menu included:
• English language
• Duplicates not included (if one event is reported by several newswires)
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B3. The Coding Process: An Illustrative Example
The following media report is one document in the entire Factiva dataset (which contains 1,706 documents covering the
1994–2016 period). Factiva has highlighted the main search terms in yellow. In addition, I have underlined text passages
that are used to code the variables in the campaigning spreadsheet.
President Museveni urges Icelandic entrepreneurs to invest in Uganda
332 words
19 September 2008 15:57
BBC Monitoring Africa BBCAP English
(c) 2008 The British Broadcasting Corporation. All Rights Reserved. No material may be
reproduced except with the express permission of The British Broadcasting Corporation.
Text of report by state-run Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) Radio on 19 September
[Presenter] President Yoweri Museveni has invited entrepreneurs in Iceland to invest in
priority areas of the Ugandan economy such as infrastructural development, harnessing energy
and agro-processing for the export market. He is in Iceland on a state visit.
Mr Museveni thanked Iceland for development and humanitarian assistance Iceland continues to
extend to Uganda, particularly in adult literacy, energy, fisheries and scientific research
to raise household income, especially among the rural poor.
He commended Iceland for her great strides in geothermal energy, hydropower, ICT and fisheries,
adding that Uganda would like to share this experience. Mr Museveni said he was impressed by
the achievements of Iceland in social, economic and political transformation, and said his
government aims to transform Uganda from a peasant society to an industrial nation.
He said Uganda will support Iceland's candidature for the United Nations Security Council
slot, saying Uganda hopes to also serve on the same council in future.
Mr Museveni invited President Grimsson to visit Uganda, which was accepted.
President Olafur Grimsson saluted the people of Uganda and hoped that the growing cooperation
between the two countries would become a model. He said President Museveni's visit was a
demonstration of the desired collaboration in geothermal resources, fishing and ICT, where
Iceland has a comparative advantage. He assured Mr Museveni that Iceland would cooperate
with Uganda.
Grimsson has said Africans, through the Organization of African Unity, the precursor to
the African Union, supported the Icelandic cause for freedom and even send a delegation of
solidarity to Iceland in support of the struggle for independence.
Grimsson, said in welcoming President Museveni and his delegation, he was paying tribute to
the vision of the African leaders, who decades ago, understood that solidarity across oceans,
was essential in building a progressive global community.
Source: UBC Radio, Kampala, in English 0400 gmt 19 Sep 08
Document BBCAP00020080919e49j000dx
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The following variables are affected by the information in this media report:
Non Aid Trade
Date Constituency Term Permanent Perm iso3A AtoB BidA iso3B SupportA SupportAB Demanded
19/09/2008 WEOG 2009–10 0 1 ISL 0 1 UGA 1 1 1
Iceland (iso3a = “ISL”) vies for a non-permanent UNSC seat (NonPerm=1 and BidA = 1), supported by Uganda (iso3b =
“UGA”). Uganda publicly declares to support this candidature (SupportA = 1). It is also implicit in the news report that
Uganda would like to intensify commercial links with Iceland in this context (TradeDemanded = 1) and is expecting sup-
port for its own future candidacy (SupportAB = 1). However, Iceland does not promise any new aid (AidAtoB = 0), while
reaffirming its ongoing development support.
B4. Data Preparation for Analysis
To allow for country-year panel data analysis, the information in the media reports needs to be aggregated. The vari-
able Media Report covers both a statement of support from another country as well as unilateral solicitation of support
for UNSC candidature by a donor. I aggregate the number of lines (representing the number of media reports) for each
unique country-year pair to obtain the (untransformed) measure Campaigns. The main analysis relies on the dummy vari-















Figure B1. Distribution of campaigning events relative to the envisaged term. Note: The sample includes media reports on
the same donors on which the main analysis is based.
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